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How to design bank capital requirements when banks can misreport the value of their
assets? We show that the answer depends critically on the existence of secondary markets
for bank assets. Without secondary markets, capital requirements based on banks￿reporting
are more socially desirable than a ￿xed capital requirement if savings on costly bank capital
are su¢ ciently high. Yet with secondary markets, banks can reduce the burden of a ￿xed
requirement by selling their assets. And they have stronger incentive to misreport and game
capital requirements based on their reporting, because low quality assets can be sold for
elevated prices. We argue that the contemporary banking system, where many bank assets
are tradable, can bene￿t from simpler but harder to game forms of capital regulation.
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High levels of leverage of investment and commercial banks prior to 2007 have been blamed for
the severity of the ￿nancial crisis that started in 2007 (IMF (2008), Acharya et al. (2009), CGFS
(2009)). Although high levels of leverage might have had many causes, existing regulatory and
accounting frameworks tied the capital ratios of investment and commercial banks to their own
judgment about the value and the riskiness of their assets.1 Such frameworks were intended to
align bank capital ratios more closely with their exposures and to increase transparency. However,
these frameworks may contribute to bank leverage because banks have an incentive to misreport
the value and the riskiness of their assets to save on costly equity capital and to shape favorably
investors￿perception about them.2 Recently, to limit bank leverage and discretion, the regulators
introduced a leverage ratio in the Basel III Accord and standardized haircuts to the SEC￿ s net
capital rule for broker-dealers (BCBS (2010), Shapiro (2010)).
In this paper, we explore a bank￿ s incentive to misreport value of its assets and its consequence
for bank capital requirements.3 We do so under two scenarios: without and with a secondary mar-
ket for bank assets. In the years before the crisis banking systems underwent a dramatic change as
tradability of banks￿traditional assets (loans) has increased. We argue that the secondary market
matters for design of capital requirements for two reasons. First, banks can use its capital more
e¢ ciently by selling its assets for which capital requirements are too high from its perspective.4
Second, if capital requirements depend on banks￿reporting, the banks￿incentive to misreport is
stronger when they can sell their assets than when they keep them. The reason is that the bene￿t
1The 1998 amendment to the Basel I Accord and the 2004 amendment to the SEC￿ s net capital rule addressing
market risk as well as the Basel II Accord addressing credit risk allow banks to use their internal risk management
models to determine their capital requirements. In accounting, determination of loan loss provisions, treatment of
repo transactions, and classi￿cation of Level 1-3 assets are the most prominent examples of how the banks can use
their judgment to adjust their leverage.
2The e⁄ect of banks￿discretion on their leverage is well documented empirically and anecdotally. Gunther and
Moore (2003) use an example of loan loss provisions. Huizinga and Laeven (2010) use Level 1-3 assets. Valukas
(2010) describes Lehman Brothers￿use of repo 105 and McLean (2011) the MF Global￿ s use of repo-to-maturity.
Shapiro (2010) comments on banks￿discretion over assumptions in their internal risk management models that
lowers capital requirements. Vaughan (2011) reports on the banks￿practice of "risk-weighted asset optimization."
3Our approach is general enough to encompass the speci￿c case of risk-based capital requirements such as the
Basel Accords and SEC￿ s net capital rule, as well as the accounting examples from footnote 1.
4Bank capital requirements are a prominent motive for loan sales by banks, and for credit risk transfer in general
(see e.g. Acharya, Schnabl and Suarez (2010), Berger and Udell (1993), Demsetz (2000), Drucker and Puri (2009),
Du¢ e (2007), Parlour and Plantin (2008), Saunders and Cornett (2006)).
1of misreporting is to sell a low-value asset for a price of a high-value asset when the investors infer
the asset values from banks￿capital ratios.5 When banks keep their assets, the only bene￿t of mis-
reporting is a lower capital requirement. We argue that a modern banking system, in which some
bank assets are tradable, can bene￿t from a ￿xed capital requirement for all banks, because it does
not rely on banks￿reporting and the banks can lower the burden from such a capital requirement
by selling their assets.
We develop a one-period model with a bank, a social-welfare-maximizing regulator, and outside
investors. The bank ￿nances a project using insured deposits and capital that is more costly than
deposits.6 Only the bank knows the value of its project. Capital requirements are needed because
of moral hazard problem a la Holmstrom and Tirole (1997): Capital provides the bank with an
incentive to exert costly monitoring e⁄ort (see e.g. Allen et al. (2011)). Because the cost of
monitoring e⁄ort and the project￿ s size are the same for each project, the minimum level of capital
for which the bank monitors a high-value project is lower than for a low-value project.
Because capital is costly, the regulator would like to use sensitive capital requirements for which
the high-value bank (the bank with the high-value project) ￿nances with a lower capital level than
the low-value bank (the bank with the low-value project). To gain insight about the project￿ s value,
the regulator can inspect the bank after the bank reports the project￿ s value. Inspection is costly
and noisy in the sense that the regulator may mistake the low-value project for the high-value one
and vice versa. When the regulator￿ s ￿nding is di⁄erent from what the bank reports, the bank
must bear costly recapitalization or, when a secondary market exists, a sale of the project. The
regulator chooses the capital requirements for the high- and low-value bank as well as the type of
penalty for misreporting and the probability of inspection.
We ￿rst consider the case without a secondary market. The low-value bank￿ s bene￿t from mis-
reporting is a lower capital requirement. The regulator chooses between the following alternatives.
The ￿rst one is an insensitive capital requirement that is the same for every bank and implies
5Dahiya, Puri, and Saunders (2003), Marsh (2006), and Acharya and Johnson (2007) provide empirical evidence
of banks￿trading on private information on secondary markets.
6The results stay the same when the deposits are uninsured so that the model is applicable to commercial
and investment banks. Capital is more expensive than deposits due to depositors￿preference for liquidity that is
provided only with deposits as in van den Heuvel (2008) (see also Diamond and Rajan (2000) and Gorton and
Winton (2000)).
2an excessively high level of capital for the high-value bank. The second one is sensitive capital
requirements that require costly inspection and penalty. If the inspection is not too costly, the
regulator chooses sensitive capital requirements. The capital requirement for the high-value bank
increases with the inspection￿ s noise. Such an increase counteracts the stronger incentive for a
low-value bank to misreport because stronger noise makes it less likely that the regulator detects
and punishes the misreporting bank. Such an arrangement is similar to complementing the Basel
II risk-based capital requirements with an upper bound on leverage that is independent of bank￿ s
risk (the so called Basel III leverage ratio) (see also Blum (2008)). If the inspection is su¢ ciently
noisy or costly, the regulator imposes the insensitive capital requirement.
We then analyze the case with a secondary market where the bank can sell the project to
competitive outside investors and redeploy its capital into new investment. The investors have two
features. First, contrary to the bank whose default is more socially costly than investors￿default,
the investors are unregulated.7 Second, the investors infer the project￿ s value from the bank￿ s level
of capital that re￿ ects information gathered by the regulator.8 These two features are enough to
intertwine bank capital regulation and the secondary market in a non-trivial way: The secondary
market has two counteracting welfare e⁄ects whose strength depends on the sensitivity of capital
requirements to the project￿ s value. The (ex post) social bene￿t is that the bank capital can be
used more e¢ ciently when the bank sells the project to the unregulated investors and redeploys
the capital to new investment. The bene￿t increases with the bank￿ s capital requirement because
a larger amount of capital is redeployed. The social cost under sensitive capital requirements is
caused by a stronger incentive of the low-value bank to misreport due to a possibility of selling the
project as a high-value bank. The social cost under the insensitive capital requirement is that the
project trades at an adverse selection discount that arises because insensitive capital requirements
do not allow the investors to infer the project￿ s value from the bank￿ s capital level.
We show that the insensitive capital requirements become more socially desirable when the
7This assumption allows us to endogenize the social bene￿t of redeploying bank capital to new investment via
the secondary market.
8This assumption represents the idea that the supervisory bank exams produce information that is new and
relevant for the bank￿ s investors. This idea has been well documented empirically by Berger and Davies (1998),
Flannery and Houston (1999), Berger, Davies and Flannery (2000), DeYoung et al. (2001), Gunther and Moore
(2003), and Perstiani, Morgan and Savino (2010).
3secondary market exists. We achieve this result in two steps. First, we show that social welfare
from the insensitive capital requirement increases when there is a secondary market. The reason is
that instead of tying up excessive amount of capital in the high-value bank by imposing on it a high
insensitive capital requirement, bank capital can be used more e¢ ciently by selling the project and
redeploying into new investment opportunities. If adverse selection is not severe, the social bene￿t
from avoiding an excessive capital requirement on the high value bank by redeploying capital to
the new investment is higher than the cost of selling the project at the adverse selection discount.
Second, we show that sensitive capital requirements become socially ine¢ cient when the reg-
ulator does not constraint the bank￿ s ability to sell the project. The social bene￿t of selling the
project is low under sensitive capital requirements because such capital requirements already re-
duce the level of capital the high-value bank has to invest in its project. Moreover, the possibility
that the investors can infer the true project￿ s value from the sensitive capital requirements turns
out to be socially costly. If the low-value bank anticipates that the high-value bank might sell,
misreporting is more pro￿table than if the high-value bank does not sell. The reason is that the
low-value bank could sell its project for the price of the high-value project rather than keep it and
lower its capital requirement.
The result is that sensitive capital requirements become socially ine¢ cient for one of two rea-
sons depending on the level of bene￿t from misreporting: (i) the low-value bank always misreports,
leading to its undercapitalization and adverse selection on the secondary market, or (ii) the cost
of additional inspection and recapitalization to counteract the increased bene￿t of misreporting is
higher than the social bene￿t of redeploying capital. As a result, the necessary condition for sensi-
tive capital requirements to be socially e¢ cient is to impose su¢ ciently high capital requirements
on the new investment so as to discourage the high-value bank from selling its project. Hence,
sensitive capital requirements become less socially desirable relative to insensitive requirements be-
cause the social bene￿t of the secondary market materializes only in case of the insensitive capital
requirements.
Our model predicts that regulatory e⁄orts to create transparency with sensitive capital require-
ments will back￿re and result in lack of transparency and undercapitalized banks when there are
4no restrictions on banks￿asset sales. This suggests that any risk-based capital requirements, such
as those from Basel II or SEC￿ s net capital rule, may be detrimental for banks￿capitalization and
transparency. This may occur especially if these capital requirements are combined with measures
such as Basel III leverage ratio or standardized haircuts that might induce banks with high qual-
ity assets to sell them, and therefore increase the incentive of banks with low quality assets to
misreport.
The paper o⁄ers some policy implications. First, the necessary condition for transparency
under sensitive capital requirements is to discourage banks with high-quality assets to sell them.
Second, discouraging banks from selling their assets eliminates, however, the social bene￿t of
secondary markets which is to put existing bank capital to more productive use. Hence, the paper
suggests that, in contemporary banking system, where many bank assets are tradeable, a high
capital requirement uniform across all banks would be better than capital requirements based
bank￿ s reporting that o⁄er banks substantial rewards for "gaming" them. Finally, the sensitivity
of capital requirements to information reported by the banks might depend on the tradability of
banks￿assets: with sensitive capital requirements for assets that are not easily sold (such as loans
to small businesses) and high insensitive capital requirements for assets that can be sold easily
(such as mortgages).
The novelty of our paper is to endogenize the link between bank capital regulation and sec-
ondary markets and relate it to bank￿ s private information. As such, the paper is related to several
independent strands of the banking literature: on the role of secondary markets, information reve-
lation, and the role of bank￿ s private information in bank regulation. Gorton and Pennacchi (1995)
and Pennacchi (1988) study the e⁄ect of secondary markets on banks￿ex post incentive to monitor,
while Parlour and Plantin (2008) study the e⁄ect on the ex ante incentive to monitor. In contrast,
we study a di⁄erent question: the e⁄ect of secondary markets on banks￿incentive to misreport. We
show that the combination of capital requirements that depend on the bank￿ s private information
and the secondary market is socially ine¢ cient. Aghion et al (1999), Mitchell (2001), and Bruche
and Llobet (2011) study banks￿incentive to reveal their non-performing assets during banking
crises. Our paper instead focuses on the incentive to misreport by solvent banks and its impact
5on the bank capital regulation. In that sense, our case without the secondary market is similar to
Prescott (2004) and Blum (2008), who derive risk-based capital requirements when risk is a bank￿ s
private information. Moreover, our presentation of the moral hazard problem is an extension of
Holmstrom and Tirole (1997) to adverse selection (see also Morrison and White (2005)).
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section 1 describes the model. In Section
2 and 3, we derive optimal capital requirements without and with the secondary market for the
bank￿ s project. Section 4 discusses the results and policy implications. Section 5 concludes the
paper. The Appendix contains proofs of the results and extensions of the model.
1 Model
Consider an economy with three dates, t = 0;1;2. There are three types of agents: a bank, a
regulator, and investors (who are described in Section 4).
1.1 Bank
The bank is owned and managed by risk-neutral shareholders protected by limited liability
(from now on, terms "bank" and "shareholders" mean the same). At t = 0 the bank can invest
in a project of size 1 described below. The bank funds the project with capital k and deposits
1 ￿ k. Capital is supplied by the shareholders, who can invest in an alternative project yielding a
net return ￿ > 0. Deposits are fully insured by a government-sponsored deposit insurance agency
and supplied at an interest rate normalized to 0.9 Positive ￿ captures the idea that capital is
more expensive for the bank than deposits. As in van den Heuvel (2008), higher cost of capital is
justi￿ed by depositors￿preference for liquidity: depositors accept a return on deposits lower than
on the alternative project in exchange for liquidity services provided only by deposits. We do not
model depositors￿liquidity preference because an explicit derivation of the di⁄erence between the
cost of capital and deposits is immaterial for the results.10
9The case of uninsured deposits is discussed in Section 4.2 and the case of outside shareholders in Section 4.3.
10Van den Heuvel (2008) derives a positive di⁄erence between the cost of capital and deposits in a general
equilibrium framework with competitive banks and households with a preference for liquidity.
6At t = 0 there are two types of projects, i = H;L. The probability that the bank faces the
project of type H (L) is ￿ 2 (0;1) (1￿￿). ￿ is known to all agents. i becomes private information
of the bank before it chooses k. The project i pays a gross return 1 + ri at t = 2 with probability
1 if the bank monitors the project at t = 1. If the bank does not monitor the project, the project
fails and pays nothing at t = 2, but the bank receives a private bene￿t in a monetary equivalent of
b and defaults on its claims to depositors. The bank￿ s monitoring decision is unobservable to other
agents. Although the return on the monitored project is deterministic, the setup can be extended
to risky returns as shown in Appendix B, so that the results of the paper extend to risk-based
capital regulation used in reality.
We assume that
rH > rL > ￿; (1)
and
1 > b > rH: (2)
(1) means that the project H is more pro￿table than L and both projects are pro￿table under
100% capital ￿nancing (k = 1). (1) allows us to study the incentive of a solvent bank to misreport
its i and eliminates algebraically tedious cases in which the bank ￿nds the project unpro￿table for
su¢ ciently high k.11 (2) means that the project i is socially valuable only if the bank monitors it
and implies that the unregulated bank i does not monitor. We use the moral hazard problem a
la Holmstrom and Tirole (1997) to model the consequences of the bank￿ s undercapitalization due
to misreporting because we can endogenize capital regulation in a simple way. Alternatively, we
could use the VaR approach used in bank capital regulation in reality, such as the standard credit
risk model used to justify the Basel II capital requirements (Repullo and Suarez (2004)). However,
such an approach would complicate the algebra without changing the results.
The setup intends to capture the idea that the bank￿ s monitoring decision is in￿ uenced by its
private information about the value of a project that is already on the bank￿ s balance sheet (e.g.,
Rajan (1992), von Thadden (2004)). To capture this idea more realistically, we could have assumed
11￿ > ri (at least for i = L) would complicate the incentive compatibility constraints described later due to
additional cases where the bank does not undertake the project for su¢ cienlty high k. The additional cases do not
provide new insights because the misreporting incentive would still exist.
7that the bank learns i after it chooses k. As Appendix B shows, such a change is immaterial for
the results because the cost of capital is constant across t so the timing of choice of k does not
matter for the bank￿ s subsequent decisions.12 Moreover, the model is meant to describe events
during a particular state of the economy known to all agents. Hence, realization of i is attributed
to the idiosyncratic features of the project observed only by the bank and does not provide any
additional signal about the state of the economy.
1.2 Regulator
The bank i, i.e., the bank with project i, that is unregulated does not monitor the project and
defaults. To see this observe that when the unregulated bank chooses k ￿ 0 at t = 0, its return
on the project i is:
max[b;1 + ri ￿ (1 ￿ k)] ￿ k (1 + ￿): (3)
The ￿rst term in (3) is the bank￿ s payo⁄ from the project. Max-indicator re￿ ects the bank￿ s
monitoring decision at t = 1. If the bank does not monitor, its payo⁄ is b due to limited liability.
If the bank monitors, its payo⁄ equals what remains from the project￿ s return after repaying
depositors, 1 + ri ￿ (1 ￿ k). k (1 + ￿) is the opportunity cost of capital invested in the bank. The
unregulated bank i chooses k = 0 because ￿ > 0 implies that (3) is decreasing in k. Given that (2)
leads to b > ri, the unregulated bank prefers not to monitor and defaults on its claims to insured
depositors that have to be repaid by deposit insurance.
We assume that the unregulated bank￿ s default leads also to additional social costs C > 0 such
as caused by disruptions in payment systems, loss of valuable lending relationships or contagion
e⁄ects. C and insured depositors￿indi⁄erence toward the bank￿ s monitoring decision provide a
need for bank regulation. The additional purpose for assuming that C > 0 is to endogenize the
social bene￿t of the project￿ s sale to investors whose default is not as socially costly as bank￿ s
default (see e.g. Du¢ e (2007)).13 The power to regulate the bank belongs to a regulator who
12Once the cost of capital varies with t and the bank is subject to capital regulation, the timing of choice of
k would in￿ uence the bank￿ s return on misreporting. However, because we want to concentrate on misreporting
incentive constant ￿ > 0 is su¢ cient. Hence, we can assume that the bank learns i before it chooses k.
13Moreover, section 4.2 shows that there is still scope for regulation if C > 0 and deposits are uninsured.
8maximizes social welfare. Although the regulator cannot observe whether the bank monitors the
project, the regulator can observe and regulate the bank￿ s capital k.14 We refer to the level of
capital required by the regulator as capital requirements.
The bank i monitors when its payo⁄ from monitoring is not lower than b:
1 + ri ￿ (1 ￿ k) = ri + k ￿ b:
Monitoring is more attractive when the project￿ s net return ri and the level of capital k increase.
Solving the above inequality for k yields that the minimum level of capital providing the bank i
with an incentive to monitor is ki = b ￿ ri. Moreover, it holds that kH < kL. The minimum level
of capital needed to provide incentive for monitoring is higher for the bank L than for the bank H
because the project L yields a lower return for which private bene￿ts are more desirable.
If i were observable at no cost, the regulator would require the bank i to hold the minimum
level of capital that provides incentive to monitor, ki. First, lower level of capital than ki would
result in the bank￿ s social cost of default. Second, more capital than ki is socially costly because
capital is more expensive than deposits. To see this observe that, if the bank i monitors, social
welfare equals the bank i￿ s return on the monitored project, 1+ri ￿(1 ￿ k)￿k (1 + ￿) = ri ￿k￿.
Positive ￿ implies that the capital requirements are socially costly because the bank cannot fully
use its ability as liquidity provider and ￿nance the project with deposits in full.15
Once i is the bank￿ s private information, introducing capital requirements equal to kH and kL
results in default of the bank L. The bank L saves on capital by choosing kH and does not monitor
the project because kH < kL. As a result, the bank L defaults, leading to socially costly default.16
14In this simpli￿ed setup, the supervisor would observe at t = 2 whether the bank monitored the project. However,
we assume that the supevisor does not have tools that could be used at t = 2 to provide the bank with an incentive
to monitor. Alternatively, we could have assumed that the project fails with some small probability if the bank
monitors.
15Positive ￿ is a reduced form of the social cost of capital requirements proposed in Van den Heuvel (2008) where
they are socially costly because they reduce the amount of deposits and therefore the provision of liquidity. Their
social cost increases with the strength of depositors￿liquidity preference re￿ ected in the di⁄erence in the cost of
equity and deposits as proxied here by ￿. See also Diamond and Rajan (2000) and Gorton and Winton (2000).
16Using (3), ki = b￿ri and rH > rL, we can show that the bank L￿ s return from choosing kH and not monitoring,
b ￿ (1 + ￿)kH, is higher than from choosing kL, rL ￿ ￿kL: b ￿ (1 + ￿)kH = rH ￿ ￿kH > rL ￿ ￿kL = b ￿ (1 + ￿)kL.
9To simplify the exposition of the results, we assume that










+ ￿(rH ￿ rL) + C
. (4)
(4) means that the regulator prefers to impose an insensitive capital requirement kL on each bank
i if i is unknown to the regulator, i.e., the regulator prefers that each bank i always monitors its
project. Such a capital requirement kL imposes a burden on the bank H that has to hold more
capital than kH, but it eliminates social cost of default of bank L.17 (4) reduces the regulator￿ s
problem to a choice between the insensitive capital requirement kL for each bank i and capital
requirements that are sensitive to i and backed by a supervisory scheme described next.
To implement sensitive capital requirements, the regulator can gain insight about i using a
supervisory scheme. The scheme consists of two instruments: inspection taking place upon the
bank￿ s report of i and a penalty. Inspection has a cost m, is stochastic, and is noisy. The regulator
inspects with probability q when the bank reports H and there is no inspection when the bank
reports L.18 The regulator detects the true i with probability ￿ 2 (1=2;1). With probability
1 ￿ ￿, the regulator detects a type di⁄erent from the true i.19 If the detected type is di⁄erent
from the bank￿ s report, the regulator can impose a penalty on the bank. The regulator can use
two penalties: recapitalization and the project￿ s sale if there is a secondary market for the bank￿ s
project.20
17Social welfare under kL for each bank i is the bank￿ s expected return on the monitored project: ￿(rH￿￿kL)+(1￿
￿)(rL￿￿kL). Social welfare when the bank L chooses kH is the bank￿ s expected return if it monitors the project H















on each bank i. The premium
appears only as the bank￿ s opportunity cost because the deposit insurance payout and revenue from the premium
are equal in expected terms. Comparing both expressions for social welfare delivers (4).
18It can be shown formally that when both types of the bank report i truthfully, it is not optimal to inspect the
type that has the incentive to misreport, i.e., type L. See Khalil (1997) for a similar treatment.
19In a general case, the probability of mistake would di⁄er across i.
20We use the two most common tools to deal with undercapitalized banks and assume away penalties such as
￿nes and bank closures. First, a bank supervisor would not use ￿nes that are disputable in court when speed of
recapitalization matters. Second, a closure of a solvent bank may be too costly for the regulators.
102 Capital requirements without the secondary market
In this section we derive capital requirements and supervisory scheme when there is no sec-
ondary market for the bank￿ s project, i.e., there are no outside investors to buy the project. Hence,
the regulator can use only recapitalization as penalty.
The timing is as follows. At t = 0 the regulator chooses and commits to the capital requirements
kH and kL, the probability of inspection q upon report of H, and a penalty with recapitalization:
an increase in the level of capital by x.21 Next, the bank learns i and decides which type to report
to the regulator. The regulator conducts inspection with probability q if the report is H and
punishes the bank if the detected type is L. The regulator does nothing if the report is L. If the
bank reports H and is not punished, it ￿nances the project with capital level kH. If the bank
reports H and is punished, it ￿nances the project with capital level kH + x. If the bank reports
L, it ￿nances the project with capital level kL. At t = 1 the bank decides whether to monitor the
project. At t = 2 the returns are realized. The timing of the events is summarized in Figure 1.22
Formally, the regulator solves the following problem:
max
kH;kL;q;x
￿(rH ￿ ￿kH ￿ q(1 ￿ ￿)￿x) + (1 ￿ ￿)(rL ￿ ￿kL) ￿ ￿qm: (5)
subject to
kH ￿ kH;kL ￿ kL; (6)
rL ￿￿kL ￿ (1￿q￿)[max[b;rL + kH] ￿ kH(1 + ￿)]+q￿ [max[b;rL + (kH + x)] ￿ (1 + ￿)(kH + x)];
(7)
rH ￿ ￿kH ￿ q(1 ￿ ￿)￿x ￿ rH ￿ ￿kL; (8)
x ￿ 1 ￿ kH; (9)
q 2 [0;1]: (10)
21The case when the regulator cannot commit to the supervisory scheme is discussed in Section 4.4.
22Because the project is ￿nanced after the report labeling the penalty as "recapitalization" is a slight terminology
abuse. We use the term "recapitalization" because a change in timing of events allowing for proper use of this term
is immaterial for results as shown in Appendix B.
11The regulator chooses kH, kL, q, and x to maximize social welfare (5) subject to constraints
(6)-(10). Social welfare (5) is the bank￿ s expected return (the ￿rst two terms) net of the expected
inspection cost (the last term). The bank￿ s expected return takes into account that the regulator
wants each bank i to reveal its i truthfully and to monitor due to (4). The ￿rst term in (5) is
the bank H￿ s return equal to the return on the monitored project, rH ￿￿kH, net of expected cost
of recapitalization, q(1 ￿ ￿)￿x. With probability q (1 ￿ ￿) the regulator inspects the bank H and
erroneously detects L, which leads to recapitalization due to the commitment to the supervisory
scheme. Recapitalization leads to a cost ￿x because it lowers deposits by x but it has an opportunity
cost of (1 + ￿)x. The second term in (5) is the bank L￿ s return on the monitored project. The
last term, the expected inspection cost, is ￿qm because under truthful reporting, the regulator
inspects with probability q when the bank is H, which occurs with probability ￿.
(6) ensures that each bank i has enough capital to monitor its project after revealing its type
truthfully. (7) guarantees that the bank L reports its type truthfully. rL ￿ ￿kL is the bank L￿ s
return under truthful reporting. The right-hand side of (7) is the bank L￿ s expected return if it
reports H. With probability (1 ￿ q) + q (1 ￿ ￿) = 1 ￿ q￿ the bank L is either not inspected or
inspected but not caught on misreporting, so it ￿nances with capital kH. With probability q￿
the bank L is caught on misreporting and is required to ￿nance with capital kH + x. The bank
L￿ s decision whether to monitor depends on its capital level as expressed by the max-operator.
(8) guarantees that the bank H reports its type truthfully. The left-hand side of (8) is the bank
H￿ s return if it reports H and the right-hand side is the return if it reports L. If the bank H
reports L, it monitors the project because kL ￿ kL > kH. (9) is the upper bound on x because
recapitalization can lead maximally to 100% capital ￿nancing. (10) is the usual constraint on
probability. The bank￿ s participation constraints are ignored because they are implied by (1), (7),
and (8).
The solution to the regulator￿ s problem delivers the following proposition.23
Proposition 1 Suppose there is no secondary market for the bank￿ s project. For each ￿ 2 (1=2;1)
and ￿ 2 (0;rL) there exist a function m(￿) as well as q and x satisfying (7)-(10) such that
23Whenever social welfare for the insensitive and sensitive capital requirements is the same, we assume the
regulator chooses sensitive capital requirements.
12social welfare is maximized if kL = kL and:
1. kH = kL for any m > m(￿);











, where ￿1 = 1 + ￿ ￿
p
￿ (1 + ￿) and ￿2 =
(1+￿)(rH￿rL)
rH￿rL+￿(1￿kH);
3. kH = kH for m 2 (0;m(￿)] and ￿ 2 [max[￿1;￿2];1).
m(￿) is 0 for ￿ ￿ ￿1 as well as positive and increasing in ￿ for ￿ 2 (￿1;1).
Proof. See Appendix A.
The proposition is illustrated in Figure 2. The regulator faces the following tradeo⁄. An
insensitive capital requirement that guarantees the bank L￿ s monitoring would impose an excessive
capital on the bank H. Sensitive capital requirements would reduce the bank H￿ s capital level
but require costly supervisory scheme to ensure that the bank L does not misreport. As a result,
the regulator chooses the sensitive capital requirements for su¢ ciently low inspection cost m and
su¢ ciently high probability of detecting true type ￿ (the cases 2 and 3). If ￿ is su¢ ciently low
(￿ ￿ ￿1), the probability of detecting bank L￿ s misreporting is so low that the resources spent by
the regulator to detect true i make the sensitive capital requirements too costly in welfare terms
for any positive m.
For intermediate ￿ and su¢ ciently high kL (the case 2) the regulator can introduce only such
sensitive capital requirements that optimal kH is higher than kH.24 The reason is that the prob-
ability of detecting bank L￿ s misreporting is so low that the bank L would always misreport its
type for kH = kH, even when the regulator always inspects (q = 1) and after recapitalization the
bank has to ￿nance the project with 100% equity (kH + x = 1). Hence, the only way to eliminate
the bank L￿ s incentive to misreport is to reduce its return from misreporting by introducing kH
bigger than kH.
24See Blum (2008) for a similar result.
133 Capital requirements with the secondary market
3.1 Investors
In this section we assume that after having ￿nanced the project, the bank can sell it on a
secondary market. Given the general nature of the model, the project￿ s sale can be interpreted as
a sale either of loans or of collateralized loan obligations. After selling the project and repaying the
depositors the bank can pay out the rest of the proceeds from the sale to the bank￿ s shareholders,
who can invest proceeds in the alternative project yielding a net return ￿.25 We assume that the
bank has to repay deposits before it pays out any of the proceeds from the sale.
There is a large number of risk-neutral and competitive investors who can buy the project
from the bank but cannot originate it. The investors can ￿nance the purchase with their capital
with the same opportunity cost as the bank￿ s shareholders￿capital, 1 + ￿, and uninsured deposits
that are supplied on a competitive market at an interest rate normalized to 0. The investors
earn the return 1 + ri when they monitor the project, and earn b if they do not. There are two
crucial di⁄erences between the bank and the investors.26 First, there is no social cost of investors￿
default.27 Second, the investors do not have technology to obtain information about i on their own
before they purchase the project.28 However, they can infer it from the bank￿ s capital before they
purchase the project, or they learn it after the purchase.
Assuming the same ￿nancing and project￿ s return structure for the bank and the investors
may seem very strong. Especially, some buyers of banks￿assets in reality, such as hedge funds,
distressed debt funds, ￿nance companies, do not provide liquidity such as banks do that would
justify the same cost of capital (Du¢ e (2007), Drucker and Puri (2009)).29 However, we make
25The implicit assumption of no investment opportunities within the bank at the time of the project￿ s sale
simpli￿es the analysis without a⁄ecting the results. In fact, the alternative project could be used to proxy for such
opportunities (see Parlour and Plantin (2008)).
26Section 4.2 shows that the assumption that the bank uses insured deposits is used only for algebraic convenience.
27Although there is no reason to regulate the investors, there might be still scope for the regulator to inspect them
given ￿ > 0. We assume it away because we want to study the e⁄ect of the secondary market on the misreporting
incentive in the simplest possible model.
28Relaxing this assumption would lead to two issues beyond the scope of this paper: who is more e¢ cient in
learning i, and what are the incentives to free-ride on provision of information about i.
29We deliberately exclude other commercial and investment banks from the set of potential investors, because
recent literature has pointed out that their engagement on secondary markets might have been due to regulatory
arbitrage inherent in existing capital regulation (Acharya et al. (2010), Nadauld and Sherlund (2008)). Such a
14these assumptions in order to show that a non-trivial relationship between bank capital regulation
and the secondary market in our model is driven rather by more fundamental di⁄erences between
banks and potential buyers of their assets: banks￿importance and their informational advantage.
Appendix C shows that allowing for further di⁄erences between the bank and the investors does
not a⁄ect the model￿ s main insight, which is the link between bank capital regulation and the
secondary market.
3.2 Optimal capital requirements
We assume that the regulator is also able to set capital requirements for the bank that sells its
project and use the project￿ s sale as a penalty. The project￿ s sale by the punished bank is described
with a variable s that takes value of 1, when the punished bank has to sell, and 0 otherwise.
The timing from Section 2 is modi￿ed as follows. At t = 0 the regulator chooses and commits
to the capital requirements kH and kL, the capital requirements kS
H and kS
L for the bank that sells
the project, the probability of inspection q upon report of H, and penalties x and s. Next, the
bank learns i and decides which type to report to the regulator. The regulator conducts inspection
with probability q if the report is H and punishes the bank if the detected type is L. The regulator
does nothing if the report is L. If the bank reports H and is not punished, it ￿nances the project
with capital level kH. If the bank reports H and is punished, it ￿nances the project with capital
level kH + x. If the bank reports L, it ￿nances the project with capital level kL. At t = 1
2 the
investors o⁄er a price for the project, the amount of capital they pledge to invest, and the deposit
rate they pay for the uninsured deposits. The bank that is not punished chooses whether to accept
or reject an investor￿ s o⁄er. If the bank sells the project and reported H (L), it adjusts its capital
according to kS
H (kS
L), pays out the proceeds from selling after repaying the depositors, and its
shareholders invest in the alternative project. The punished bank sells only if s = 1.30 At t = 1
the owner of the project decides whether to monitor. At t = 2 the returns are realized. The timing
regulatory arbitrage is not the topic of this paper.
30Without loss of generality, the punished bank H that sells is subject to the same capital requirement kS
H as the
bank that is not punished. We show in the proof of Lemma 4 the regulator will eliminate the incentive to sell for
any bank.
15of the events is summarized in Figure 3.31
In order to determine the optimal capital requirements, we proceed as follows. First, we derive
optimal capital requirements separately for two cases: when the regulator does not inspect the
bank (q = 0) and inspects it (q > 0). The reason is that each case has di⁄erent implications for
outcomes on the secondary market as explained below. Second, we determine the optimal capital
requirements by comparing social welfare from the optimal capital requirements for q = 0 and
q > 0.
3.2.1 The case without inspection
We now analyze the optimal choice of capital requirements when the regulator does not inspect.
Because social welfare depends on the bank￿ s return, we ￿rst analyze equilibria on the secondary
market at t = 1
2 after the bank has chosen its capital requirements at t = 0. We present the
solution for insensitive capital requirements, k = kH = kL and kS = kS
H = kS
L, because, as we
show in the proof of Lemma 3, the regulator can achieve the highest social welfare for q = 0 using
insensitive capital requirements. Sensitive capital requirements without inspection cannot deliver
higher welfare than the insensitive because the bank L always has an incentive to misreport, not
allowing the regulator to lower the capital requirement for the bank H below kL.
At t = 1
2 the investors o⁄er only one price P because they cannot infer the bank￿ s i from
the bank￿ s choice of capital requirements if they are insensitive.32 While choosing a price P, the
investors anticipate the bank i￿ s incentive to sell the project. If the bank i does not sell, its payo⁄
depends on whether k is high enough to provide the bank with an incentive to monitor:
max[b;1 + ri ￿ (1 ￿ k)] = max[b;ri + k]:
31We assume away the possibility that the bank can sell between learning and reporting i. If q = 0, this does not
matter. If q > 0, selling before i is revealed to the investors is not optimal because it would lead to selling at most
for a pooling price.
32We assume that the investors do not observe the bank￿ s report to the regulator because it simpli￿es the
description of the equilibria without changes in results. Moreover, signalling with capital is not possible because
its cost is the same for each bank i. Even if signalling with capital were possible, it would not be socially e¢ cient,
because capital invested by the bank H would never be lower than kL. Otherwise, the bank L would always mimick
the bank H and default.
16The opportunity cost of investing capital in the project does not enter the bank￿ s payo⁄ at t = 1
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is the additional amount of capital invested in the bank according to kS, (1 ￿ k)




is the available capital that the bank redeploys
into the alternative project to earn 1+￿ per unit invested. Because the bank has to repay deposits
1￿k after selling the project, kS ￿k has to be high enough to cover 1￿k, i.e., kS ￿ 1. Comparing








i is the reservation price of the bank i. P R
i decreases in k, meaning that the bank is more willing
to sell if k increases. The reason is that by selling the bank can free up and redeploy more capital
to the alternative project where it earns 1 + ￿ on each unit of capital. P R
i also increases in kS.
Moreover, it holds that P R
H ￿ P R
L for any k and kS, meaning that the bank H is less willing to
sell than the bank L.33 The reason is that the project H is more valuable than L. Hence, one of
three possible outcomes on the secondary market can arise for given P as well as k and kS that
determine the reservation prices: (i) each bank i sells if P ￿ P R








H > P R
L , or (iii) none of the banks sells if P < P R
L .
The competitive investors o⁄er the highest possible P anticipating the bank￿ s reservation prices
given k and kS. The investors ￿nance the purchase of the project for a price P with their own
capital e and uninsured deposits P ￿e. The investors can attract cheap, uninsured deposits only if
they commit to monitoring the project. Hence, P and e are determined not only by the investors￿
participation constraint but also by their incentive compatibility constraint, ensuring that the
investors monitor the project by investing their own capital. How much capital the investors
invest depends on their own and depositors￿anticipation of which project will be sold (i.e., which




1+￿ ￿ 0 because rH > rL.
17bank will sell).
First, if only the bank L is anticipated to sell, the investors invest capital su¢ cient to monitor
the project L. Because the project L succeeds with probability 1, the investors o⁄er also net deposit
rate 0 for deposits. Hence, the investors￿incentive compatibility constraint reads that their return
on the monitored project L after repaying deposits, 1+rL ￿(P ￿ e), cannot be lower than b. The
investors￿participation constraint reads that the investors￿return covers the opportunity cost of
investing capital in the project, e(1 + ￿). Both constraints boil down to
1 + rL ￿ (P ￿ e) ￿ max[b;e(1 + ￿)]:
Second, if each bank i is anticipated to sell, the investors can attract deposits by committing
to one of two monitoring decisions. On the one hand, the investors may commit to monitor
both projects. They pay a deposit rate 0 because the projects always succeed. The incentive
compatibility constraint is the same as if only the bank L sells because i is unknown at the time
of purchase. Hence, the investors have to invest so much capital up-front that they commit to
monitor the less valuable project L. The participation constraint reads that the expected return
on both projects after repaying deposits covers the opportunity cost:
￿ (1 + rH) + (1 ￿ ￿)(1 + rL) ￿ (P ￿ e) ￿ e(1 + ￿):
On the other hand, the investors may commit to monitor only the project H and default on the
project L. At the time of purchase, the expected probability of investors￿default is the probability
that the project is L, 1 ￿ ￿. The investors are still able to attract the uninsured deposits by
compensating them with a deposit rate 1
￿ ￿1 > 0.34 Hence, the incentive compatibility constraint
reads that the investors￿return on the project H after repaying the deposits, 1
￿ (P ￿ e), is not
lower than b:
1 + rH ￿
1
￿
(P ￿ e) ￿ b:
34The depositors expect to be repaid with probability ￿. If the gross deposit rate is 1 + d, the depositors break
even on every unit lent to the investors if ￿ (1 + d) = 1, so the net deposit rate is d = 1
￿ ￿ 1.
18The investors￿participation constraint guarantees that the investors￿expected return on the project
covers the opportunity cost:
￿
￿





+ (1 ￿ ￿)b ￿ e(1 + ￿);
which takes into account that the investors earn b and default if the project is L. The investors
choose e and the highest possible P, taking into account their own constraints and anticipating
the bank￿ s selling decision.
The following proposition characterizes the outcomes on the secondary market under k, kS and
q = 0.
Lemma 2 Suppose there is a secondary market for the bank￿ s project and q = 0, k = kH = kL,
kS = kS
H = kS
L. Denote kP1 = kL +
(1￿￿)(rH￿rL)
￿ , kP2 = kH +
(1￿￿)(1+￿)(1￿kH)
￿ and ￿0 =
(1+￿)(1￿kL)
(1+￿)(1￿kL)+￿(rH￿rL) < ￿C. One of four cases may arise depending on k, kS and ￿.
1. For k ￿ kP1 + kS ￿ 1, kS ￿ 2 ￿ kP1, and ￿ 2 (0;￿0) each bank i sells the project for a
price ￿ (1 + rH)+(1￿￿)(1 + rL)￿￿
b+￿(rH￿rL)
1+￿ . The investors invest capital
b+￿(rH￿rL)
1+￿
and monitor each project i.
2. For k ￿ kP2 + kS ￿ 1, kS ￿ 2 ￿ kP2, and ￿ 2 [￿0;￿C) each bank i sells the project for
a price ￿ (1 + rH) + (1 ￿ ￿)b ￿ ￿b
1+￿. The investors invest capital b
1+￿ and monitor only
the project H.
3. For k 2
￿
kL + kS ￿ 1;minfkP1;kP2g + kS ￿ 1
￿
, kS ￿ 2 ￿ kL, and ￿ 2 (0;minf1 ￿
￿(rH￿rL)
(1+￿)(1￿kH);￿Cg) only the bank L sells the project for price 1+rL ￿ ￿b
1+￿. The investors
invest capital b
1+￿ and monitor the project.
4. For any other k, kS, and ￿, none of the banks sells the project.
Proof. See Appendix A.
Lemma 2 highlights the role of capital requirement k for the bank￿ s incentive to sell its project.
If k is su¢ ciently high, even the bank H sells the project, because the return on capital k from
the alternative project is so high that it compensates for selling the project at a discount to its
19true value (the cases 1 and 2). As it can be seen from the prices paid by the investors, the
discount has two sources: adverse selection (the ￿rst two terms in expression for the project￿ s
price) and investors￿￿nancing of the purchase with costly capital (the third terms in expression
for the project￿ s price) . If k falls below the thresholds from the case 1 or 2 only the bank L sells
its project (the case 3). For some low k even the bank L keeps the project (the case 4). Lemma
2 shows also that kS cannot be too high. Otherwise, the bank would keep the project for any
k ￿ 1.35
Lemma 2 also shows that for su¢ ciently high ￿ (the case 2) the investors o⁄er the highest
price when they monitor only the project H despite the fact that by defaulting on the project L
yields b instead of 1+rL. The reason is that for su¢ ciently high ￿ the probability that the project
turns out to be L is so low that the savings on lower capital outlay because of monitoring only the
project H are higher than the loss of return on the project L.36
The consequence of the fact that investors monitor only the project H for su¢ ciently high ￿
is a di⁄erence between the investors￿optimal monitoring decision and the bank￿ s socially optimal
monitoring decision, which is to monitor both projects for any ￿ < ￿C. This di⁄erence in the
monitoring decisions is the driver of Lemma 3 that presents the optimal capital requirements for
q = 0. Social welfare is equal to the bank￿ s expected return from each of three possible outcomes
on the secondary market because competitive investors￿surplus is 0 and the regulator does not
inspect.
Lemma 3 Suppose there is a secondary market for the bank￿ s project and q = 0. The highest social
welfare can be achieved using insensitive capital requirements k = kH = kL and kS = kS
H = kS
L
such that the following conditions are ful￿lled. kS is 1.

















the optimal k is any
35Separating on the secondary market cannot arise because the investors do not have tools other than price to
separate the bank H and L. However, it can be shown that even if the project is divisible, a pooling equilibria from
Lemma 2 still exist for su¢ ciently high ￿. For such ￿ the bank H prefers to sell the whole project for a pooling
price than retain some of it and sell it for a price re￿ ecting the true value of its project.
36To see this observe that the di⁄erence between the price the investors pay when they monitor only the project
H and when they monitor both projects is given by the di⁄erence in prices from the case 2 and 1 in Lemma 2.
After some algebra this di⁄erence equals
￿￿(rH￿rL)
1+￿ ￿ (1 ￿ ￿)(1 + rL ￿ b), where the ￿rst term is the savings on
investors￿capital ￿nancing and the second is the loss of return from defaulting on the project L. This di⁄erence
becomes positive for ￿ > ￿0.
20k ￿ kP2. Both banks sell the project and the investors default on the project L. Social
welfare is higher than in the case of the insensitive capital requirement kL without the
secondary market.
2. Otherwise optimal k = kL. The investors never default on the purchased project. Social
welfare is the same as in the case of the insensitive capital requirement kL without the
secondary market.
Proof. See Appendix A.
Lemma 3 is illustrated in Figure 4. If ￿ is su¢ ciently high (the case 1) the regulator chooses
any k for which each bank i sells the project. Any k not lower than kP2 is su¢ cient because the
cost of capital is constant over t. Hence, precise choice of k at t = 0 does not matter because
the bank can recuperate k at t = 1
2. The regulator prefers each bank to sell the project rather
than keep it because the project￿ s sale yields higher expected return on the bank capital than the
alternative, which is to make the bank keep the project.37 The driver of this result is that the
investors￿optimal monitoring decision is to monitor only the project H. The regulator accepts the
investors￿ s default on the project L because their default has no social cost. In contrast, if each
bank i were to keep the project, the regulator would require each bank i to invest kL to monitor and
prevent their default. Hence, instead of tying so much capital in each bank i, the project can be
sold to the investors. The di⁄erence in monitoring between the bank and the investors translates
into high price for the project through the savings on the investors￿￿nancing with costly capital.
This high price leads to a higher expected return on bank capital from redeploying it into the
new investment. In other words, by selling the project the existing bank capital is put into more
productive use and the project sale allows to avoid social cost of excessive capital requirement kL
on the bank H.
It is important to note the special role of capital requirements in Lemma 3. In order to realize
the social bene￿t of project￿ s sale the capital requirement k has to be su¢ ciently high to make
37The other possibillity is to make the bank L sell its project and make the bank H keep it. But for this to be
pro￿table for the bank L the capital requirement for the bank H has to be kL, which is the same capital requirement
if each bank i keeps the project. For any bank H￿ s capital requirement lower than kL the bank L would prefer to
keep its project and default.
21the bank H to sell its project at an adverse selection discount. Otherwise, the bank H does not
internalize this social bene￿t and will keep its project.
If ￿ is su¢ ciently low (the case 2), the regulator is indi⁄erent between making the bank keep
or sell the project. The reason is that the investors ￿nd it optimal to monitor the project for
any i which is the same monitoring decision required by the regulator from the bank. Hence, the
expected return on bank capital from selling the project is the same as from keeping it, because
there are no savings on investors￿costly capital ￿nancing to be translated into an additional return
on the new investment.38
The consequence of Lemma 3 is that for su¢ ciently high ￿ the insensitive capital requirements
become more socially desirable when there is a secondary market than when it does not exist.
The reason is that the secondary market reduces the bank H￿ s burden from the insensitive capital
requirement kL in case the bank were to keep the project.
3.2.2 The case with inspection
Now we analyze the optimal capital requirements when q > 0. For q > 0 the regulator
introduces sensitive capital requirements because inspection would be socially wasteful under in-
sensitive capital requirements. Before we present the regulator￿ s choice of capital requirements,
we ￿rst discuss the outcomes on the secondary market at t = 1
2 and then the bank￿ s misreporting
incentive at t = 0.
We start with the secondary market at t = 1
2. After the bank reveals its i truthfully to the
regulator at t = 0, the investors can correctly infer i from the bank￿ s choice of capital requirements
ki. If the punished bank recapitalizes with x, the investors also correctly infer that in a truthtelling
equilibrium it can only be the bank H. Hence, the price o⁄ered for the project i, Pi, and the capital
invested by the investors, ei, have to be such that the investors￿return on the monitored project
after repaying deposits, 1 + ri ￿ (Pi ￿ ei), cannot be lower than the private bene￿ts and the
opportunity cost of capital:
1 + ri ￿ (Pi ￿ ei) ￿ max[b;(1 + ￿)ei]:
38Section 4.1 discusses this result when the monitored project￿ s returns are stochastic.
22The investors o⁄er the deposit rate of 0 because the monitored project always succeeds. The
competitive investors o⁄er P ￿
i = 1 + ri ￿ ￿b
1+￿ and invest capital ei = b
1+￿ such that the last
inequality is binding. The reason is that the investors earn zero pro￿ts and invest such amount of
capital that guarantees the highest possible price. Proof of Lemma 2 o⁄ers the formal argument.
The project trades at a discount ￿b
1+￿ to its value due to investors￿￿nancing with costly capital.
If the bank i that is not punished at t = 0 sells its payo⁄is analog to the one from the previous
section with the only di⁄erence that this time we add index i to indicate dependence of capital

















If the bank i does not sell at t = 1
2, its payo⁄ is 1 + ri ￿ (1 ￿ k) = ri + ki, because the regulator
imposes ki ￿ ki. For any k < ki the bank i keeps the project and defaults.39 By comparing the
bank i￿ s payo⁄s from keeping and selling as well as using the expression for P ￿
i , we get that the
bank i sells if the capital requirement for keeping the project is su¢ ciently high, ki ￿ ki + kS
i ￿ 1.
Similarly, the punished bank H is even more willing to sell in order to eliminate the burden from
costly recapitalization and sells for ki ￿ ki+kS
i ￿1￿x. The last expression arises after comparing




H ￿ (kH + x)
￿








H ￿ (kH + x)
￿￿
(1 + ￿),
and its payo⁄from keeping, 1+ri￿(1￿k￿x) = ri+ki+x, after taking into account recapitalization.
Hence, as in the previous section, the bank sells if capital requirements for keeping the project are
su¢ ciently high.
Now we analyze the bank￿ s incentive to report its type truthfully at t = 0. First, if ki, x, and
kS
i are such that each bank i keeps the project at t = 1
2, the constraints guaranteeing truthtelling
are the same as in the case without the secondary market, (7) and (8). Second, once ki, x, and kS
i
39This can be seen by comparing the bank i￿ s payo⁄ from selling and from keeping, which is b if ki < ki. b is






. Given that kS
i cannot be lower than 1 (otherwise
the bank could not repay its depositors), the bank i will always keep if ki < ki.
23are such that at least the punished bank H sells its project at t = 1
2, the truthtelling constraint for
the bank L becomes tighter than (7).40 The reason is that the bank L￿ s payo⁄ from misreporting
is higher than in the case if the bank H does not sell (the ￿rst term on the right-hand side of
(7)). By reporting H the bank L can sell its low-value project for the price of the high-value one,
whereas if it does not sell it keeps the less valuable project and is subject only to a lower capital
requirement kH. Tighter truthtelling constraint for the bank L makes it costlier for the regulator
to obtain truthful revelation of the bank L￿ s type because the regulator has to inspect the bank
more often and impose harsher penalty.
In fact, if there are no restrictions on the project￿ s sales (kS
i = 1 and s = 1), the bank L always
misreports and truthtelling unravels for any q and x. Unravelling results in adverse selection on
the secondary market, because the investors infer correctly that with some probability the bank L
gets away with misreporting and tries to sell its project as the project H. Depending on kH and
severity of adverse selection there are three possible outcomes on the secondary market as in the
previous section. In the worst case, none of the banks sells because kH is so small that even the
bank L prefers to keep its project and defaults causing social cost C.
Once the regulator takes into account the negative e⁄ect of the secondary market on the bank
L￿ s incentive to report its type, the optimal capital requirements kS
i are as follows.
Lemma 4 Suppose there is a secondary market for the bank￿ s project and q > 0. The regulator
￿nds optimal to discourage the bank H from selling the project by imposing su¢ ciently high
kS
H > 1 + kH ￿ kH. The optimal kS
L is equal to or bigger than 1.
Proof. See Appendix A.
Lemma 4 shows that under sensitive capital requirements, the regulator ￿nds it optimal to
provide the bank H (whether it is or is not punished) with an incentive to keep the project rather
than sell by imposing su¢ ciently high kS
H. Su¢ ciently high kS
H limits the amount of capital that
can be redeployed to the new investment. This limit discourages the project￿ s sale because the
amount of capital that can be paid out is so small that the return on it from the alternative
40The formal presentation of the bank L￿ s truthtelling constraint is suppressed to the proof of the following
lemma.
24project cannot compensate for the discount ￿b
1+￿ at which the project trades. By eliminating the
bank H￿ s incentive to sell the regulator relaxes the bank L￿ s truthtelling constraint and lowers the
social cost of inspection and penalty needed to implement the sensitive capital requirements. It
occurs despite of potential bene￿t from selling. However, the bene￿t of reducing the burden from
capital requirements by selling is low because sensitive capital requirements already reduce the
bank H￿ s burden from the costly capital requirements. Hence, the social bene￿t of the project￿ s
sale is outweighed by its cost in terms of the bank L￿ s higher incentive to misreport.41
The consequence of Lemma 4 is that the regulator can introduce capital requirements such as
kH = kLR
H from the case 2 in Proposition 1. If there is no secondary market, kLR
H guarantees that
the bank L reveals its type for ￿ such that inspection with q = 1 and recapitalization leading
to 100% equity ￿nancing are not su¢ cient to do so. However, if there is a secondary market
and there is no limit on the amount paid out by the bank beyond what is needed to repay the
deposits, the bank H would sell to avoid kLR
H making the truthful revelation of the bank L harder
to achieve.42 Hence, kLR
H , although designed to encourage truthful reporting of i, would back￿re
by increasing the bank L￿ s incentive to misreport. The only way to return kLR
H to its original
purpose of encouraging truthtelling is to discourage selling by the bank H by imposing kS
H such as
in Lemma 4.
After the regulator eliminates the punished bank H￿ s incentive to sell, selling could still be
used as a penalty because the project trades at the discount ￿b
1+￿ to its true value. However, selling
can be used as a penalty only if such a penalty relaxes the truthtelling constraint of the bank L
by su¢ ciently lowering the bank L￿ s return from being caught on misreporting. This might not
always be the case because in the truthtelling equilibrium, only the bank H is punished. Hence,
the bank L caught on misreporting would sell as the bank H.
Lemma 5 Suppose there is a secondary market for the bank￿ s project and q > 0. If ￿b
1+￿ ￿ rH ￿rL
the optimal s is 0 and the optimal sensitive capital requirements kH and kL are the same as
in Proposition 1.
41Section 4.1 discusses Lemma 4 when there is an additional positive welfare e⁄ect of the seconadry market if the
returns are stochastic.
42The bank H sells if kS
H ￿ 1 + kH ￿ kH. Hence, without any restrictions on payouts, kS
H = 1, the bank H sells
because kH = kLR
H > kH.
25Proof. See Appendix A.
If the discount ￿b
1+￿ is too low, the regulator will never use selling as a penalty, s = 0, because
the bank L￿ s return from being caught on misreporting is so high that the bank L￿ s truthtelling
constraint is tighter than (7). s = 0 in combination with Lemma 4 implies that the optimal sensitive
capital requirements kH and kL are the same as in Proposition 1 because the bank H always keeps
the project. In what follows, for exposition reasons, we disregard the case when the discount ￿b
1+￿ is
higher than rH ￿rL. In such a case, the regulator could punish the bank L with selling and would
have more room to introduce sensitive capital requirements for some ￿ for which it is not possible
when there is no secondary market. Despite this additional room to punish the main result of this
section, Lemma 4, is una⁄ected: Under sensitive capital requirements the regulator eliminates the
bank￿ s incentive to sell contrary to the case of insensitive capital requirements, where the regulator
may want to encourage it as in case 1 of Lemma 3.
3.3 Optimal capital requirements
The next proposition describes the regulator￿ s choice between the insensitive and sensitive
capital requirements when the secondary market exists.
Proposition 2 Suppose there is a secondary market for the bank￿ s project and ￿b
1+￿ ￿ rH ￿ rL.
The optimal kS
H = kS
L = 1 if kH = kL or kS
H > 1 + kH ￿ kH and kS
L￿1 if kH < kL. The


















each ￿ 2 (1=2;1) and ￿ 2 (0;rL), there exist a function mS (￿), thresholds ￿1S and kL
0 as
well as q and x satisfying (7)-(10) such that social welfare is maximized if:
1. kH = kL ￿ kP2 for m > mS (￿);
2. kH = kL￿
￿￿(1￿kL)
(1￿￿)(1+￿) > kH and kL = kL for m 2 (0;mS (￿)), ￿ 2 [￿1S;￿2) and kL > kL
0;
3. kH = kH and kL = kL for m 2 (0;mS (￿)) and ￿ 2 [max[￿1S;￿2];1).
mS (￿) is 0 for ￿ ￿ ￿1S as well as positive and increasing in ￿ for ￿ 2 (￿1S;1). It holds that
￿1S > ￿1, kL




and mS (￿) < m(￿) for any ￿ > ￿1.
26For any other ￿ or kL the solution for kH, kL, q, and x is the same as in Proposition 1.
Proof. See Appendix A.
Proposition 2 is an immediate consequence of Lemma 3, 4 and 5. For ￿ such that the secondary
market does not provide any social bene￿t under insensitive capital requirements, the optimal


















the insensitive capital requirements become more socially desirable
with respect to the sensitive capital requirements. The reason is that the secondary market under
the insensitive capital requirements reduces the bank H￿ s burden by allowing for more e¢ cient use
of capital, which is not possible under the sensitive capital requirements. Formally, the threshold
for inspection cost m for which the insensitive capital requirements deliver higher welfare becomes
lower as expressed by mS (￿) < m(￿) for any ￿ > ￿1 as shown in Figure 5.
4 Discussion
4.1 Stochastic returns
So far we have assumed that the project i￿ s return is certain if the bank monitors. In this
section, we discuss the case of the stochastic returns and present the formal treatment in Appendix
B. For simplicity, we assume that the project￿ s returns are binary if the bank monitors: The project
either succeeds or fails. The bank￿ s projects di⁄er in a probability of failure, which is the bank￿ s
private information.
The ￿rst consequence is that the regulator may charge the bank that monitors with deposit
insurance premia covering the deposit claims in case of the bank￿ s default. Appendix B shows that
this extension does not deliver any additional insights to the model.
The second consequence is an additional and positive e⁄ect of the secondary market on social
welfare. If probability of failure is positive for at least one project, the sale of such a project to
the investors eliminates a possibility of incurring social cost of bank default C for any capital
requirements chosen by the regulator (Du¢ e (2007) and Acharya et al (2010) point out that the
credit risk transfer may be socially e¢ cient because it leads to diversi￿cation of risk and increase
27in ￿nancial stability). First, the result from Lemma 4 where the regulator eliminates the bank
H￿ s incentive to sell obtains only for su¢ ciently low C. The reason is that the social bene￿t of
the secondary market is now higher because the project￿ s sale not only lowers the bank￿ s burden
from capital requirements but it also eliminates the possibility of socially costly bank￿ s default.
Hence, if C is su¢ ciently high, the bank is allowed to sell under sensitive capital requirements
and some restrictions preventing unravelling of the truthtelling incentives. However, the result
from Proposition 2 that the insensitive capital requirements become more socially desirable when
the secondary market exists becomes even stronger.43 The insensitive capital requirements allow
for the realization of both positive e⁄ects of the secondary market, whereas the sensitive capital
requirements result either in bank keeping the project at the expense of a possible bank￿ s default
for low C or in elimination of this cost at the expense of higher cost of inspection and penalty for
high C.
4.2 Case of uninsured depositors
Throughout the paper we have assumed that the bank raises only insured deposits. Now we
discuss the case of uninsured deposits. An unregulated bank can attract such deposits only if it
commits enough capital to monitor. Although uninsured deposits are a source of market discipline
there is still scope for regulatory intervention for two reasons. First, neither the bank nor the
investors internalize social cost of the bank￿ s default, which may result in the bank attracting
deposits by making a socially ine¢ cient monitoring decision. Second, the regulator can ensure
that the capital is used more e¢ ciently by imposing sensitive capital requirements and therefore
providing the depositors with information about i that will be re￿ ected in the deposit rate paid
by the bank. In the baseline model, the deposit rate for i is 0 because of the deterministic return.
Under stochastic returns the deposit rates will re￿ ect the di⁄erence in the banks￿probability of
failure in the same way as the fair deposit insurance premia re￿ ect it when the deposits are insured.
Hence, the paper￿ s results do not depend on the case whether deposits are insured or uninsured.
43We leave out details of the formal argument because they are similar to the ones presented in the paper.
284.3 Additional agency problems
So far we have assumed that the bank￿ s shareholders are the sole suppliers of capital and bank
managers. Here we discuss consequences of relaxing this assumption. First, if we allow for outside
shareholders, the incentive to misreport for the bank L is higher than under inside equity. The
reason is that for a given amount of capital injected into the bank, the outside shareholders require
a smaller share of pro￿ts from the bank H than from the bank L whose project is less valuable.
Hence, by mimicking the bank H the bank L can sell the outside shareholders a share of its pro￿ts
smaller than it would if its type was known.44 This would tighten the truthtelling constraint of the
bank L in comparison with the case of inside capital and would lead to a lower social welfare from
sensitive capital requirements because the regulator would have to inspect and punish more often.
However, this e⁄ect is not as detrimental to the incentive to reveal the true type as the e⁄ect of
the project￿ s sale. The reason is that the bank L still keeps the project on its books.
Second, the assumption that shareholders manage the bank assumes away a con￿ ict of interests
between the bank￿ s shareholders and the hired manager. The shareholders who want to maximize
their return on capital would be interested in misreporting. However, the manager might be
interested in truthful reporting, say, for career concern reasons. Hence, misreporting arises when
the shareholders provide the manager with a compensation contract that aligns interests of both
parties. In such a case, the problem boils down to the one studied in the baseline model. If
the regulator could in￿ uence compensation contracts or impose su¢ ciently high penalties on the
managers, misreporting would not arise (John et al. (2000) provide a rationale for including the
managerial compensation in the bank regulation).
4.4 Regulatory forbearance
We have assumed in the baseline model that the regulator can commit to inspection and
penalty. However, commitment of that sort is often seen as unrealistic in the banking context
44Once the new shareholders aquire the bank￿ s shares, their own and old shareholders￿interests are the same
implying that capital requirements are una⁄ected by a division of the returns between shareholders. If ￿ is a share
of the bank owned by a shareholder, the shareholder receives ￿(ri + k) if the project is monitored or ￿b if not.
Hence, every shareholder makes the same monitoring decision regardless of its stake in the bank.
29due to so-called regulatory forbearance. In our model, regulatory forbearance would mean that
the regulator has no incentive to conduct costly inspection and order costly recapitalization (see
Huizinga and Laeven (2010) for evidence on such forbearance).
The easiest way to model the regulatory forbearance is to assume that the regulator cannot
commit to the inspection but the bank is punished whenever the report is di⁄erent than the result
of inspection. Because the regulator decides whether to inspect after the bank￿ s report, the game
between the bank and the regulator may have an equilibrium in mixed strategies in the regulator￿ s
inspection and the bank L￿ s misreporting (Khalil (1997)). Because the bank L misreports with
some probability, it will also default with some probability imposing social cost C. Hence, the
insensitive capital requirements become more socially desirable because they eliminate regulatory
forbearance given that they do not require inspection and recapitalization as penalty. This result
is even stronger when there is a secondary market. The reason is that the regulator is even less
willing to inspect and order recapitalization because the possible default of the bank L can also
be avoided by allowing the bank to sell.
4.5 Policy implications
In our model, sensitive capital requirements become detrimental to the bank￿ s incentive to
misreport when the bank can sell its project, even if the regulator uses all of the available means to
inspect and punish the misreporting bank. In the context of the model, a limit on dividends paid
out to shareholders that is su¢ ciently high to prevent the bank H from selling would restore the
bank￿ s incentive to misreport. In an extended framework, measures such as retention of part of
the sold project (if the project would be divisible) or an increase in capital requirements (if there
were additional investment opportunities within the bank) would serve as equivalent instruments.
Moreover, insensitive capital requirements become more socially desirable than sensitive capital
requirements for two reasons. First, insensitive capital requirements eliminate the problem of bank
undercapitalization because they do not rely on bank￿ s reporting. Second, the bank can reduce its
burden from such a high capital requirement by selling its assets on the secondary market. Finally,
the paper suggests that the sensitivity of capital requirements might depend on the liquidity of the
30bank assets: with sensitive capital requirements for assets that are not easily sold (such as loans
to small business ￿nance) and high insensitive capital requirements for assets that can be easily
sold (such as mortgages).
5 Conclusions
The paper derives socially optimal sensitivity of bank capital requirements when the value of
the bank￿ s project and actions are the bank￿ s private information. It is done under two scenarios:
without and with the secondary market for the bank￿ s project. We show that the secondary market
is crucial for the bank￿ s incentive to reveal the value of its project. Sensitive capital requirements
become less socially desirable if the bank can sell its project without any constraints. The reason
is that the bank￿ s incentive to misreport is greater when the bank can sell its assets instead of
keeping it. The results of the paper have important consequences for the current overhaul of the
bank capital regulation. We show that a combination of risk-based capital requirements and a
leverage ratio like in the Basel III Accord can be detrimental for the truthful revelation of the
bank￿ s private information when the bank can sell its project. We propose to introduce a high and
uniform capital requirement for all banks.
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7 Appendix A - Proofs
Proof of Proposition 1
The maximization problem (5)-(10) can be simpli￿ed by making ￿ve observations. First, optimal
kL is kL, because setting kL > kL decreases social welfare and strengthens the bank L￿ s incentive to
misreport its type. Second, it has to hold that kH ￿ kL, because for kH > kL the bank H would prefer
to report L. Third, it has to hold that x ￿ kL ￿kH so that the bank L monitors the project if punished.
Suppose that x < kL ￿ kH. Because the punished bank L earns b, the truthtelling constraint for the
bank L does not hold, because it reads rL ￿ ￿kL ￿ b ￿ kH(1 + ￿) ￿ q￿(1 + ￿)x, which is equivalent to
x ￿
kL￿kH
q￿ > kL ￿ kH and contradicts x < kL ￿ kH. Fourth, (7) has to bind. Otherwise the regulator
would increase social welfare by lowering x or q. This implies together with kL = kL that (7) boils down
to x =
1+￿￿q￿
q￿￿ (kL ￿kH). Fifth, (8) can be ignored because it is slack when the regulator ￿nds optimal to
set sensitive capital requirements. Suppose that optimal kH < kL, as well as q and x were such that (8)
would bind. Then kH < kL is not optimal because the regulator could increase social welfare by setting
kH = kL = kL and q = x = 0, which would keep the bank H￿ s payo⁄the same and save on implementation
cost.
After using all the observations, inserting x =
1+￿￿q￿
q￿￿ (kL￿kH) into W1 and into (9) as well as ignoring
constants in W1 the maximization problem (5)-(10) boils down to:
max
kH;q
1 ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿(2￿ ￿ 1)
￿
kH+q((1 ￿ ￿)(kL￿kH) ￿ m) (11)
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The lower bound on q comes from inserting x =
1+￿￿q￿
q￿￿ (kL ￿ kH) into (9). We divide the analysis into
















. The last interval is
















. For this set of parameters it holds that 1 > e q(kH), i.e.,
kH = kH is feasible.
Claim The maximization problem (11)-(12) has only one of three solutions: (i) kH = kH and q = e q(kH),
(ii) kH = kH and q = 1, or (iii) kH = kL and q = 0.
Proof. First, the optimal q is either 1 or e q(kH), because (11) is linear in q for any kH. Second, for q = 1,
the solution is either kH = kH or kH = kL, because (11) is linear in kH. Third, for q = e q(kH), the solution
is again either kH = kH or kH = kL, because (11) is convex in kH. To show that (11) is convex in kH








. This also implies that
q = 0 for kH = kL. Fourth, the solution kH = kL and q = 1 delivers lower value of the objective function
than kH = kL and q = 0. These four observations imply the claim.
Which of the three solutions (i)-(iii) delivers higher welfare is determined by comparing the values
of (11) at the respective solutions. First, kH = kH with q = e q(kH) delivers higher welfare than kH = kH
with q = 1 for m > (1 ￿ ￿)(rH ￿ rL) ￿ m12. Second, kH = kL yields higher welfare than kH = kH with







￿ , and than kH = kH with q = e q(kH)
for m > max[m2;0], where m2 ￿ ￿
h
￿(rH￿rL)





. Simple algebra shows that
m1 = m2 = m12 =
￿(rH￿rL)
1+2￿ > 0 for ￿ = 1+￿
1+2￿. Hence, kH = kL and q = 0 yields the highest welfare for
m > max[0;m1] if ￿ < 1+￿
1+2￿ and m > m2 if ￿ ￿ 1+￿
1+2￿. Taking derivatives of m1 and m2 with respect to

























. For this set of parameters it holds that e q(kH) > 1. Hence, for
kH = kH there are no q 2 [0;1] and x ￿ 1 ￿ kH for which (7) holds. The lowest kH for which (7) holds
for q = 1 and x = 1 ￿ kH is kH = kL ￿
￿￿(1￿kL)
(1￿￿)(1+￿) ￿ kLR
H . The set of constraints for maximization of
(11) becomes: kL ￿ kH ￿ kLR
H ;1 ￿ q ￿ e q(kH). Using the similar chain of arguments as in the proof of
35the above claim we can show that this time there are two possible solutions: kH = kLR
H and q = 1, or
kH = kL and q = 0. Comparing the values of (11) at the respective solutions shows that kH = kL and














mlr ￿ 0 for ￿ 2
h
1 + ￿ ￿
p
￿ (1 + ￿);1
i
, where ￿ = 1 + ￿ ￿
p
￿ (1 + ￿) is the lower bound of the solution
to ￿ ￿
(1￿￿)2
(2￿￿1) ￿ 0, which determines if mlr ￿ 0. mlr = m1 holds for ￿ =
(rH￿rL)(1+￿)












Denote ￿1 = 1 + ￿ ￿
p
￿ (1 + ￿) and ￿2 =
(rH￿rL)(1+￿)
rH￿rL+￿(1￿kH). Using all the properties derived above, we
can de￿ne a piecewise and continuous function m(￿) such that
m(￿) =
8
> > > > > > > > <























Moreover, for any ￿ > 0 it holds that 1
2 < ￿1 < 1+￿
1+2￿ < 1 and ￿2 < 1. Hence, the ultimate shape of m(￿)
depends on the parameters, which determine the position of ￿2. If ￿2 ￿ ￿1, the part with mlr is missing.
If ￿1 < ￿2 < 1+￿
1+2￿, m(￿) consists of all four parts. If 1+￿
1+2￿ ￿ ￿2, the part with m1 is missing.
We conclude that kH = kL = kL and q = x = 0 is the solution to the regulator￿ s maximization problem
(5)-(10) for m > m(￿). kH = kL ￿
￿￿(1￿kL)
(1￿￿)(1+￿) > kH, kL = kL with q = 1 and x =
(1+￿￿￿)(1￿kL)
(1￿￿)(1+￿) is the













. kH = kH and kL = kL supported by q = 1 and
x =
(1+￿￿￿)(kL￿kH)
￿￿ or q = 1
￿
(rH￿rL)(1+￿)
rH￿rL+￿(1￿kH) and x = 1 ￿ kH are the solution for the rest of parameters,
i.e., m 2 (0;m(￿)) and ￿ 2 (max[￿1;￿2];1).
Proof of Lemma 2
We prove the lemma in four steps.
Step 1: The highest pooling price the investors can o⁄er is P1 = 1 + ￿rH + (1 ￿ ￿)rL ￿ ￿
b+￿(rH￿rL)
1+￿
for ￿ 2 (0;￿0) and P2 = ￿ (1 + rH) + (1 ￿ ￿)b ￿ ￿b
1+￿ for ￿ 2 [￿0;￿C).
Proof: The constraints on P and e for the cases when the investors anticipate each bank i to sell are
derived in the text. Because the investors are competitive both constraints have to bind. If the incentive
compatibility constraint is slack and the participation constraint binds the investors can increase P and
36lower e and still attract deposits. If the incentive compatibility constraint binds and the participation
constraint is slack, the investors can increase both P and e and still make a pro￿t. Hence, the competitive
investors set e and raise P until both constraints bind. The investors o⁄er P1 = 1 + ￿rH + (1 ￿ ￿)rL ￿
￿
b+￿(rH￿rL)
1+￿ and invest capital
b+￿(rH￿rL)
1+￿ if they commit to monitor both projects or P2 = ￿ (1 + rH) +
(1￿￿)b￿ ￿b
1+￿ and invest capital b
1+￿ if they commit to monitor only the project H. Comparing P1 and P2
shows that P1 < P2 holds for ￿ 2 (0;￿0) and P2 ￿ P1 for ￿ 2 [￿0;￿C). P2 ￿ P1 holds for any ￿ 2 [￿0;1)
but we restrict the parameter space for ￿ only to ￿C due to (4).￿
Step 2: The pooling outcome in which each bank i sells the project arises exists for k ￿ kP1 +kS ￿1,
kS ￿ 2 ￿ kP1 if ￿ 2 (0;￿0), where kP1 = kL +
(1￿￿)(rH￿rL)
￿ , or for k ￿ kP2 + kS ￿ 1, kS ￿ 2 ￿ kP2 and
￿ 2 [￿0;￿C), where kP2 = kH +
(1￿￿)(1+￿)(1￿kH)
￿ .
Proof: A pooling outcome exists if the bank H sells at a pooling price, i.e., pooling price is not lower
than PR
H. The inequality P1 ￿ PR
H is equivalent to k ￿ kP1 + kS ￿ 1, and P2 ￿ PR
H to k ￿ kP2 + kS ￿ 1.
kP1 and kP2 cross at ￿ = ￿0 and kP1 < kP2 for ￿ 2 (0;￿0). Because k is bounded from above by 100%
equity ￿nancing, i.e., k ￿ 1, the pooling outcome exists if kP1 ￿ 1 or kP2 ￿ 1, which are equivalent to
kS ￿ 2 ￿ kP1 or kS ￿ 2 ￿ kP2.￿
Step 3: Only the bank L sells the project for k 2
￿
kL + kS ￿ 1;min
￿
min[kP1;kP2] + kS ￿ 1;1
￿￿
and
kS such that the interval is not empty.
Proof: If k and kS are such that the conditions derived in Step 2 do not hold, the bank H does not
sell the project. The investors anticipate it so they infer that only the bank L would be ready to sell and
they o⁄er the highest possible price for the project L, 1 + rL ￿ ￿b
1+￿ and invest b
1+￿ (again the investors￿
constraints derived in the text for the case when only the bank L is anticipated to sell are binding). The
bank L sells if the price for its project is not lower than its reservation price PR
L . 1 + rL ￿ ￿b
1+￿ ￿ PR
L is
equivalent to k ￿ kL + kS ￿ 1. Hence, only the bank L sells its project if
k 2
￿
kL + kS ￿ 1;min
￿
min[kP1;kP2] + kS ￿ 1;1
￿￿
:
The upper bound of this interval is given by the thresholds derived in step 2. This interval is not empty
if its lower bound is smaller than the upper bound. If kP1 +kS ￿1 is the upper bound, the interval is not
empty for any kS. If kP2 + kS ￿ 1 is the upper bound, the interval is not empty for ￿ < 1 ￿
￿(rH￿rL)
(1+￿)(1￿kH).
If 1 is the upper bound then the interval is not empty for kS ￿ 2 ￿ kL.￿




+ kS ￿ 1.
37Proof: The claim follows directly from the result in Step 3. ￿
Proof of Lemma 3
First, we derive the socially optimal insensitive capital requirements. Second, we show that restricting
the regulator￿ s choice to the insensitive capital requirements when q = 0 is without loss of generality.
Step 1: The optimal insensitive capital requirements are such that the following conditions are satis￿ed.

















. k = kL otherwise.
Proof: Under insensitive capital requirements the regulator anticipates that the outcomes on the
secondary market are such as in Lemma 2 for given k, kS and ￿. First, we study the case for ￿ 2 (0;￿0).
For k 2
￿
kP1 + kS ￿ 1;1
￿
and kP1 + kS ￿ 2 both banks sell for the pooling price P1. Social welfare
consists of the expected bank￿ s return, which is
(P1 + k)(1 + ￿) ￿ 1 ￿ kS￿ ￿ k(1 + ￿) = P1 (1 + ￿) ￿ 1 ￿ kS￿
because each bank i sells for the same price and faces the same kS. For k 2
￿
kL + kS ￿ 1;min
￿
kP1 + kS ￿ 1;1
￿￿
only the bank L sells and its return is
(P￿




The bank H￿ s return is rH ￿ ￿k. For other k and kS none of the banks sells so their returns are ri ￿ ￿k.
We ignore the case k < kL, because the bank L would default, which is socially ine¢ cient under (4)
(observe that kP1 > kL for any ￿ 2 (0;1)). The regulator chooses k and kS to maximize social welfare
8
> > > > <
> > > > :
￿ (rH ￿ ￿k) + (1 ￿ ￿)(rL ￿ ￿k), if k 2
￿
kL;kL + kS ￿ 1
￿
￿ (rH ￿ ￿k) + (1 ￿ ￿)
￿
rL ￿ ￿kL + ￿
￿
1 ￿ kS￿￿
, if k 2
￿
kL + kS ￿ 1;min
￿
kP1 + kS ￿ 1;1
￿￿
P1 (1 + ￿) ￿ 1 ￿ kS￿, if k 2
￿
kP1 + kS ￿ 1;1
￿
and kP1 + kS ￿ 2
subject to kS ￿ 1. The regulator sets kS = 1 because social welfare is decreasing in kS where applicable.




























, if k 2 [kP1;1] and kP1 ￿ 1.
38Because the ￿rst part of social welfare is maximized for k = kL, the regulator is indi⁄erent between k = kL
or any k 2 [kP1;1] if kP1 ￿ 1. Hence, the regulator can achieve the highest possible welfare by simply
imposing k = kL and social welfare is the same as in the case of the insensitive capital requirement kL
without the secondary market.
For ￿ 2 [￿0;￿C) social welfare in the pooling outcome is always higher than in the pooling equilibrium
for ￿ 2 (0;￿0), because P2 > P1. In the rest of the equilibria in which either only the bank L sells or
none of the banks sells, the highest social welfare is the same as for ￿ 2 (0;￿0) and is obtained for k =
kL. Hence, for ￿ 2 [￿0;￿C) social welfare is maximized when each bank sells for P2 for any k ￿ kP2 if
kP2 ￿ 1, which is equivalent to ￿ ￿ 1


















. For any other parameters the pooling
outcome is not feasible and the best the regulator can do is to set k = kL.￿
Now we show that sensitive capital requirements cannot deliver higher social welfare than the insen-
sitive. We denote as W0 social welfare from the insensitive capital requirement kL. When the regulator
imposes sensitive capital requirements there are two possibilities: either they are such that each bank
reports its type truthfully or at least one bank misreports. The latter case is not interesting because it
results in adverse selection as in the case of insensitive capital requirements. Hence, the optimal capital
requirements are as described in Step 1 above. Hence, we are interested only in the case when sensitive
capital requirements are such that each bank reports truthfully.
Step 2: Capital requirements for which a separating equilibrium with truthtelling may occur do not
deliver higher welfare than W0.
Proof: A separating equilibrium in which the bank i reports its type truthfully can exist only if the
capital requirements are di⁄erent so that investors can condition their o⁄ers on the choice of the capital
requirements. To prove the claim from step 2 it su¢ ces to analyze capital requirements such that the
bank i￿ s truthtelling conditions are satis￿ed. In a separating equilibrium there are four potential outcomes
on the secondary market: each bank i sells/keeps, one bank sells and the other keeps.
First, observe that if ki and kS
i are such that in a separating outcome the bank H keeps the project,
social welfare cannot be higher than W0. The reason is that the regulator has to choose kH that is not
lower than kL, which delivers welfare not higher than W0. Otherwise the bank L would ￿nd it pro￿table
to mimic the bank H, keep the project (if the bank H ￿nds it more pro￿table to keep the project, the
same holds for the bank L whose project is less valuable than the project H) and default, which is socially
39ine¢ cient due to (4).
Now observe the following. In a separating equilibrium with truthtelling the investors correctly infer
the bank￿ s type from the choice of capital requirements. Hence, the price o⁄ered for the project i, Pi,
and the capital invested by the investors, ei, have to be such that the investors￿return on the monitored
project after repaying deposits, 1 + ri ￿ (Pi ￿ ei), cannot be lower than the private bene￿ts and the
opportunity cost of capital: 1 + ri ￿ (Pi ￿ ei) ￿ max[b;(1 + ￿)ei]. The investors o⁄er the deposit rate
of 0 because the monitored project always succeeds. The competitive investors o⁄er P￿
i = 1 + ri ￿ ￿b
1+￿
such that the last inequality is binding. The formal argument for binding constraints is identical to the
one presented in the proof of Lemma 2. When the bank i reports truthfully and sells for the price P￿
i , its




















If the bank i deviates from the truthtelling and reports j 6= i, its return from such a misreporting is Vj.
Second, we analyze the case when each bank i sells. This requires that selling delivers higher return
than keeping for each bank i, Vi ￿ ri ￿ ￿ki. The bank L reports its type truthfully if the return from
reporting L and selling, VL, is not lower than the payo⁄ from reporting H and selling, VH (keeping is
worse than selling in case of misreporting because if selling is more pro￿table for the bank H, then it
must also be for the bank L that pretends to be H): VL ￿ VH. Now observe that it always holds that
VL ￿ rL ￿￿kL. Hence, it implies that the bank H￿ s return VH in such a separating equilibrium the bank
H is not higher than rL￿￿kL. That is a lower return than in the case when the regulator simply imposes
insensitive kL and the bank H￿ s return is rH ￿ ￿kL. Hence it follows that a separating equilibrium when
each bank i sells is not socially e¢ cient.
Finally, we analyze the case where the bank H sells and the bank L keeps. The bank L reports its type
truthfully if its return from reporting L and keeping is not lower than reporting H and selling (keeping
can be ignored for the same reason as above), rL ￿￿kL ￿ VH;because the regulator imposes kL ￿ kL due
to (4). Hence, such an equilibrium would again deliver welfare lower than W0 for the same reasons as
above (for the bank H it holds that VH ￿ rL ￿ ￿kL ￿ rL ￿ ￿kL < rH ￿ ￿kL).￿
Proof of Lemma 4
40At the beginning we show that the truthtelling unravels when the regulator does not place any restric-
tions on the project￿ s sale, i.e., s = 1 and kS





kL ￿ kL.45 The investors pay P￿
i when they see that the bank has capital level corresponding to report
of i. Using the payo⁄s from selling at t = 1
2 derived in the text, kS
i = 1 and the expression for P￿
i we note
that the bank H that is not punished has a payo⁄ from selling equal to rH ￿ ￿kH + kH (1 + ￿) and the
bank H that is punished, rH ￿ ￿kH + (kH + x)(1 + ￿):At t = 0 once the opportunity cost of the initial
investment kH, kH (1 + ￿) and of potential recapitalization x, x(1 + ￿), is taken into account, the return
of the bank H at t = 0 whether it is punished or not is rH ￿ ￿kH. If the bank L anticipates at t = 0
that the bank H always sells its project, its expected return from misreporting at t = 0 is also rH ￿￿kH.
Because it holds that rH ￿ ￿kH > rL ￿ ￿kL, the bank L always misreports if the bank H can sells its
project in an unrestricted fashion.
Now in two steps we show that the regulator has to discourage the project￿ s sale as a necessary
condition for socially e¢ cient sensitive capital requirements.
Step 1: For the bank L the optimal kL and kS
L are such that kL = kL and kS
L ￿ 1 or kL ￿ kL and
kS
L = 1.




and kL ￿ kL. The regulator can relax the truthtelling constraint of
the bank L when the bank L￿ s payo⁄ from revealing its type is the highest. Hence, the optimal kL and
kS
L are such that kL = kL and kS
L ￿ 1 or kL ￿ kL and kS
L = 1. To see this observe that, if the bank L






Hence, the regulator can achieve the highest possible return from truthtelling for the bank L, rL ￿ ￿kL,
by imposing kL = kL and kS
L ￿ 1 or kL ￿ kL and kS
L = 1. To simplify the exposition we assume that the
regulator simply chooses kL = kL and kS
L ￿ 1.￿
Step 2: The optimal kS
H is such that the bank H keeps the project, kS
H > 1 + kH ￿ kH ￿ x.
Proof: First, we show that the bank L has stronger incentive to misreport if the bank H sells than if it





and it is not lower than its return
from keeping rH ￿￿kH. Now if the bank L misreports, it gets the same return as the bank H if the bank
H sells and it gets b￿(1 + ￿)kH if the bank H keeps. Because it holds that rH ￿￿kH > b￿(1 + ￿)kH (it





> b ￿ (1 + ￿)kH. This implies
that the bank L￿ s payo⁄ from misreporting if the bank H sells is higher than if the bank H keeps.
45For any kH ￿ kL the bank L￿ s incentive to misreport is not interesting because it always monitors if it mimicks.
For any ki < ki the bank i keeps the project and defaults which is socially ine¢ cient due to (4).
41Second, we show that the regulator prefers to make the bank H that is not punished keep its project.
The increased incentive to misreport tightens the truthtelling constraint of the bank L because the bank L￿ s
return from not being caught on misreporting increases when compared with case when the bank H keeps.
Then the regulator is forced to spend more resources (higher q or x) on making the truthtelling constraint
hold than in the case when the bank H keeps. Now, the regulator can improve social welfare by leaving the
return of the bank H unchanged and relaxing the bank L￿ s truthtelling constraint. The regulator can do
so by increasing kS
H and decreasing kH in such a way that the bank H keeps the project and has the same
return from keeping as from selling under old kS
H, i.e., such k0
H that rH ￿ ￿k0







H, if the bank L misreports, it cannot sell the project as the bank H, so its payo⁄from misreporting
is b ￿ (1 + ￿)k0
H, for which it holds that
b ￿ (1 + ￿)k0
H < rH ￿ ￿k0





as long as k0
H > kH. This proves the claim that the regulator can increase welfare by keeping the bank
H￿ s payo⁄ the same, but relaxing the truthtelling constraint of the bank L, which allows the regulator to
save on the costly supervisory scheme. Observe that we can prove using the same arguments the claim
that the regulator should set such kS
H that the punished bank H does not have the incentive to sell either.
Because the bank H that is punished is more willing to sell than if it is not punished we get the result
that kS
H > 1+kH ￿kH is su¢ cient enough to eliminate the incentive to sell for the bank H whether it is
punished or not.￿
Proof of Lemma 5
Observe that once the regulator eliminates the bank￿ s incentive to sell by making the bank keep a
su¢ ciently high portion of the sale proceeds, the regulator can still nevertheless use selling as a penalty.
The reason is that the project as can be seen from P￿
i sells at a discount to its fair value because of costly
capital that the investors lay out. Whether selling is indeed a penalty for the bank L depends on the
comparison of its return from being caught on misreporting if s = 0 and s = 1. If s = 0 then the bank L￿ s
return is the same as in (7), rL ￿ ￿ (kH + x). If s = 1, the bank L after deviating from the truthtelling
and being caught on misreporting sells as the bank H, because in the truthtelling equilibrium only the
42bank H is punished. Hence, the bank L￿ s return for s = 1 is
P￿
H ￿ (1 ￿ kH ￿ x) ￿ (1 + ￿)(kH + x) = rH ￿
￿b
1 + ￿
￿ ￿ (kH + x).
If the bank L￿ s return for s = 1 is not lower than its return for s = 0, the regulator will set s = 0. The
reason is that for s = 1 the regulator would tighten the bank L￿ s truthtelling constraint and decrease the
bank H￿ s return, which would lead to a decrease in social welfare. After comparing the returns this holds
for rH ￿ ￿b
1+￿ ￿ rL. If s = 0 then the constraints on sensitive capital requirements are the same as in
Section 2, hence the regulator ￿nds optimal the sensitive capital requirements as in Section 2.
For rH ￿ ￿b
1+￿ < rL s = 1 is a penalty for the bank L. Again it is obvious that s = 1 is not always
optimal because it is also a welfare loss due to the bank H￿ s decreased return. In fact, we can show
that if the discount ￿b
1+￿ is high enough, the regulator ￿nds it optimal to set s = 1. This will also lead
to additional solutions for the sensitive capital requirements given that the additional penalty gives the
regulator more scope to punish the bank. However, we do not provide the full derivation of this result,
because it is very similar to the one presented in the proof of Proposition 1.￿
Proof of Proposition 2
The optimal sensitive capital requirements are as in Proposition 1 because Lemma 4 and5 imply that
the regulator￿ s program for sensitive capital requirements is identical to the program (5)-(10) from Section
2. In order to determine whether the sensitive or insensitive capital requirements are optimal, we have to
compare social welfare from both types of capital requirements.
For ￿ < ￿0 as well as ￿ 2 [￿0;￿C) and other parameters such that the pooling outcome with P2 is not
feasible, the optimal insensitive capital requirements with the secondary market deliver the same welfare
as the optimal insensitive capital requirements without the secondary market. Hence, the solution is the


















such that the pooling outcome
with P2 arises, social welfare from the sensitive capital requirements has to be compared with social
welfare from the insensitive capital requirements under the outcome that the bank sells for the pooling
price P2. We conclude that there is a new function mS (￿) such that it holds mS (￿) < m(￿) whenever
m(￿) > 0. Moreover, mS (￿) < m(￿) implies that the thresholds as functions of ￿ that determine the
parts of the function mS (￿) need to increase. It is straightforward because social welfare when the bank
43sells for a pooling price P2 is higher than in the case without the secondary market, what was shown
in Lemma 3. Now we derive mS (￿). The insensitive capital requirements deliver higher social welfare
than the sensitive capital requirements with kH = kH for m > max
h








￿￿0 . It holds that m1 ￿ z > m2 ￿ z




capital requirements deliver higher social welfare than the sensitive capital requirements with kH = kLR
H
for m > max[mlr ￿ z;0]. The inequality mlr ￿ z ￿ 0 holds for ￿ 2 [￿1S;1], where ￿1S = 1 + ￿ + a
2 ￿
q
￿ (1 + ￿) + a2
4 + a￿ with a = ￿
1+￿
￿￿￿0





1+2￿ holds for ￿ ￿ ￿0. Summarizing all results give us the following function:
mS (￿) =
8
> > > > > > > > > <





mlr ￿ z, ￿ 2 [￿1S;￿2) if ￿1S < ￿2






if ￿2 < 1+￿
1+2￿
m2 ￿ z











To complete the claim we show that ￿1S < ￿2 holds for higher kL than ￿1 < ￿2 holds. This follows from
two facts: ￿2 is increasing in kL and ￿1S > ￿1. Hence there is a threshold k0




for which ￿1S < ￿2.
8 Appendix B - Change in the timing and stochastic re-
turns
8.1 Change in timing and insured deposits
We allow for the following changes to the model presented in the paper: (i) the project￿ s returns are
stochastic, (ii) the bank learns i after it has ￿nanced the project. The timing of the model presented in
the Figure 6 is as follows. At t = 0 the bank raises capital k0 and insured deposits d0. At t = 1 the bank
receives a perfect signal about the type of the project i, can adjust its capital to ki and deposits to di
and decides whether to monitor it. At t = 2 the returns are realized. If the bank monitors, the project
pays 1 + r at t = 2 with probability 1 ￿ pi or 1 ￿ ￿ with probability pi. pi is called probability of default
(PD) of the project i. If the bank doesn￿ t monitor the project, the bank gets b and the project pays 1￿￿
with probability 1. At t = 0 the probability that the project will be of type H (L) at t = 1 is ￿ (1 ￿ ￿)
44and pH < pL. To simplify the exposition we assume that ￿ = 1. The cost of capital is ￿ at t = 0 and
t = 1. The analogue of (1) is (1 ￿ pL)r > ￿:If the regulator knew i at t = 1 k1 and d1 would satisfy the
following two conditions:
(1 ￿ pi)(1 + r ￿ di) ￿ b and ki + di = 1 + pidi:
The ￿rst condition guarantees that the bank i monitor the project (deposits are insured and supplied at
a deposit rate normalized to 0). The second condition is the balance sheet of the bank at t = 1, where
the bank invests ki and di in the project of size 1 and a fair deposit insurance premium pidi. Because the
capital is socially costly the regulator would like to set such di that the ￿rst condition binds. Hence, the
minimum level of capital providing the bank i with an incentive to monitor, ki, and corresponding di are




To justify the capital regulation we use an analogue of (2):
b > (1 ￿ pi)(1 + r) ￿ 1;
which guarantees that ki > 0. di is always positive because (1 ￿ pi)(1 + r) > 1 > b. Observe that
kH < kL because pH < pL. Hence, the minimum capital requirements increase with the probability of
default pi.
If the regulator does not observe i, the implementation of kH and kL is subject to the same adverse
selection problem as in the baseline model. Hence, we proceed directly to the truthtelling constraints and
show only the truthtelling constraint of the bank L:
(1 ￿ pL)
￿












1 + r ￿
1 ￿ kH ￿ x
1 ￿ pH
￿
￿ (1 + ￿)(kH + x ￿ k0)
￿
:
The constraint already takes into account that kH ￿ kL ￿ x + kH has to hold, that the optimal kL for
the bank L is kL and di =
1￿ki
1￿pi. The right-hand side is the bank L￿ s payo⁄ from reporting L at t = 1.
The ￿rst term is the payo⁄ at t = 2 and the second term is the opportunity cost of adjustment of capital
45at t = 1 from k0 to kL. The left-hand side is the bank L￿ s expected payo⁄ from misreporting at t = 1.
The ￿rst term is the payo⁄ in case the bank is not caught on misreporting with probability 1 ￿ q￿. The
second term is the payo⁄ when the bank L is punished with probability q￿. Because in the truthtelling
equilibrium only the bank H is punished the regulator sets the deposit insurance premium for the bank
caught on misreporting according to the PD of the bank H. Hence the bank L while deviating from
truthtelling takes into account that it will be treated as the bank H when it is caught too, so its deposits
after recapitalization are 1￿kH￿x




















The ￿rst observation is that (14) is slightly more complicated than the truthtelling constraint of the






(kL ￿ kH). The reason is that
the bank L the source of savings on the capital is not only ￿ but also the fact that the bank H gets a
di⁄erent insurance premium.
The second observation is that k0 does not play any role in (14). This implies that the initial capital
structure does not play any role for the bank￿ s incentive to misreport once i is revealed to the bank. This
is due to the fact that ￿ is independent of k0, kH, kL, and x. Hence, once we maintain exogenously given
￿ we can simplify the model by dropping the initial stage of ￿nancing the project before i is revealed and
stick to the timing proposed in the baseline model.
8.2 Uninsured deposits
Observe that the same truthtelling constraint as (14) arises when the deposits are uninsured. The reason
is that the bank that ￿nances a project of size 1 has 1￿k deposits for which it has to pay a gross deposits
rate 1
1￿p to compensate the depositors for probability of default. If the depositors infer the probability of
default of the bank i from the capital level after the regulatory inspection then in truthtelling equilibrium
the gross deposit rate of the bank caught on misreporting is 1
1￿pH. At the same time the minimum
capital level that the bank i with uninsured deposits needs to monitors is (1 ￿ pi)
￿




ki = 1 + b ￿ (1 ￿ pi)(1 + r), which is the same as in the case of insured deposits. This establishes
the equivalence of the case between insured and uninsured deposits when the regulator provides the
information about i.
469 Appendix C
We assume that the investors are not e¢ cient users of the bank￿ s project, i.e., they return they generate
on the project in case of monitoring falls by ￿ > 0, and have a higher cost of monitoring as expressed







i . Hence, we get that the return on the bank capital is lower because
there is additional discount when the project is sold, ￿+
￿￿
1+￿. This decreases the social desirability of the
insensitive capital requirements. Hence, the case 1 from Lemma 3 obtains only for su¢ ciently low ￿ and
￿, because the capital is used more e¢ ciently only when the discount on the price from ￿ and ￿ does not
o⁄set the gain from transferring the project to the investors who monitor less intensely than the bank.
Introducing a wedge in the cost of capital between the bank and the investors also has similar conse-
quences. If the cost of capital for the investors is more costly then the capital of the bank, the intuition
behind the consequences is the same as for ￿ > 0 and ￿ > 0. If the cost of capital for the investors is
less costly for the bank (see Parlour and Plantin (2008), Parlour and Winton (2009)), then selling the
project becomes more attractive. Its e⁄ect is similar to introducing the positive probability of default as
proposed in Section 4.1.
Figures
Figure 1: The timeline of the events for the regulated bank when there is no secondary market.
47Figure 2: Proposition 1 in case ￿2 > ￿1. The ￿gure illustrates the choice of socially optimal kH as
a function of inspection noise (￿) and inspection cost (m). The ￿gure distinguishes three regions:
a region de￿ned by m > m(￿) in which the capital requirements are insensitive (kH = kL); a
region de￿ned by m ￿ m(￿) and ￿ < ￿2 in which the capital requirements are sensitive but
complemented with leverage ratio (kH = kL ￿
￿￿(1￿kL)
(1￿￿)(1+￿)), and a region de￿ned by m ￿ m(￿) and
￿ ￿ ￿2 in which the capital requirements are sensitive (kH = kH).
Figure 3: The timeline of the events for the regulated bank when there is secondary market.
Figure 4: The ￿gure illustrates the regions in which the respective solutions for k from Lemma 3
arise. The region 1 corresponds to the solution k ￿ kP2 (the case 1), the region 2 to the solution
k = kL (the case 2).

















. The blue (upper) curve is de￿ned as m = m(￿) and the red
(lower) curve as m = mS (￿). The region between the blue and red curve is the region in which the
insensitive capital requirement with secondary market and sensitive capital requirements without
secondary market deliver the highest social welfare.
Figure 6: Modi￿ed time line
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